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CONTROLLING IMPROPER FINANCIAL GAIN IN
INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS
KRISTINA WILKEN"
When I went with the lawyer to pick up Kate-some part of town I could
never find again-her mother was lying there, not in a house really, more
like a stall with a bed in it.... It was like we were going baby shopping.'
Although once rarely contemplated, international adoption has become a
realistic option fok couples in the United States. In fact, the United States has
received more foreign children for adoption than any other country in the
world.2 Since the first wave of international adoptions in the late 1940s,3
over 130,000 children have been adopted into this country.4 As international
adoptions have grown in popularity, both licensed agencies and private indi-
viduals have appeared in great numbers as adoption intermediaries s High
demand for adoptable children encourages these intermediaries to trade chil-
dren for large amounts of money.6 Informally, this practice is known as "ba-
by selling."7 While there is no clear consensus that the exchange of some
* J.D. 1995, Duke University School of Law.
1. Mary Jo McConahay, The Baby Trade, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, (Magazine) at 12, 13
(quoting Cathy Dickenson, a woman from the United States who adopted a child in Hondu-
ras).
2. Romanian Adoptions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Law', Immigration, and Refugees
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1991) [hereinafter Romanian
Adoptions] (statement of William L. Pierce, President, National Committee for Adoption).
3. International adoptions began after World War II when many U.S. citizens began
adopting children to "rescue" them from war-tom countries. Margaret Liu, Note, International
Adoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 187, 191 (1994).
4. Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 TULSA L.J. 317, 318 (1988).
International adoptions by U.S. citizens are estimated to account for more than half of all
international adoptions. Romanian Adoptions, supra note 2, at 197 (statement of William L.
Pierce).
5. See Arsenio Oloroso, Jr., A Baby Boom for Adoption Biz: Chicagoan Sees Overseas Supply
for Local Demand, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Feb. 21, 1994, at 17.
6. Legalized abortion and readily available contraceptives have contributed to a decrease
in the supply of adoptable children in developed countries like the United States. At the
same time, the demand for adoptable children in those countries has grown. Single parenting
has gained increased societal acceptance, and women in Western countries increasingly spend
many of their childbearing years building careers and delaying childbearing until later in life
when conception is more difficult. Furthermore, domestic adoption agencies, with a limited
supply of children to place, set demanding requirements of age, race, and income for adop-
tive parents which many prospective adoptive parents are unable to fulfill. Ellen F. Epstein,
Note, International Adoption: The Need for a Guardianship Provision, 1 B.U. INT'L L.J. 225, 227-29
(1982); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 61
(1987).
7. "The lack of state regulatory requirements for international adoption agencies has per-
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money in an adoption process is morally wrong, the exchange of large
amounts of money for children may create improper incentives for birth
mothers to release their children for adoption.
Most international adoptions are arranged through agencies licensed by
administrative or judicial bodies of a particular country to place children
from that country.8 However, adoptions are also handled through "indepen-
dent agents" who may be private adoption lawyers, social workers, or other
persons acting as liaisons between the adoptive parents and the birth par-
ents, guardian, or orphanage.9 In some countries, independent agents are
part of the de facto adoption process." These individuals are not licensed to
place children, but they may locate children for adoption, obtain the consent
of the birth parents, and process the ensuing paperwork.11 Although li-
censed agencies must process the adoption, intermediaries often procure the
children" and the licensed agencies do not routinely monitor this portion of
the endeavor. 3
Since administrative oversight is negligible, 4 independent agents have
great opportunities to derive improper profits and use exploitative tactics in
dealing with birth parents and prospective adoptive parents. Frequently,
intermediaries deal with adoptive parents who are anxious or desperate to
find children. Adoptive parents often must pay intermediaries large fees to
obtain an adoptable child. 5 Usually, birth parents only receive a small por-
tion of this fee. Also, agents may work through unofficial channels to obtain
babies. They use contacts with doctors and orphanages to learn when babies
are born or they go directly to disadvantaged mothers or pregnant wom-
mitted unscrupulous individuals to set up businesses, often without prior experience or exper-
tise in the field of adoption." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS 7 [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONs] 1992.
8. Holly C. Kennard, Comment, Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking of Children: A Discussion
of the Hague Conference Convention in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L.
623, 627 (1994).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 641 n.100 (discussing South Korea, which has one of the strictest intercountry
adoption regimes, but in whose quasi-state-sponsored agency money still changes hands).
11. Id. at 627-28. Independent agents may be hired to avoid delays at state agencies, to
circumvent agency investigations of the prospective adoptive family, or for the chance to
choose a particular type of child. Id.
12. See McConahay, supra note 1, at 14-15.
13. See id. at 13-15 for a discussion of Honduras, which in 1990 had some of the least
stringent adoption laws in the world. The official agency process for an adoption from Hon-
duras includes hiring a Honduran lawyer whose high fees must be paid separately from the
official agency fee.
14. Several officials interviewed for McConahay's article admitted that they felt children
were better off leaving the desperately poor country in any manner possible. Id.
15. Payments to adoption intermediaries can range from $3000 to $15,000; usually, the
birth mother gets only a tiny fraction of that amount. See Kathleen Hunt, The Romanian Baby
Bazaar, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1991, §6 (Magazine) at 24, 28 (discussing Romania); Kennard,
supra note 8, at 628 n.1 (discussing Honduras); McConahay, supra note 1, at 13-15 (discussing
Honduras).
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en.16 Often, they convince these women to give up their children in ex-
change for a small gift or payment.
Many of the abuses inherent in babyselling activities can be resolved
through international agreement on proper adoption procedure. In May 1993,
after negotiations and drafting meetings spanning three years, the Hague
Conference on Private International Law completed the Convention on Pro-
tection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.'8
The Hague Convention is the first international agreement specifically ad-
dressing trafficking in children for adoption placement purposes. The United
States signed the Hague Convention on July 4, 1993"9 and is expected to
ratify it in late 1995.'o The Convention combats baby selling by establishing
international norms and procedures designed to prevent improper "financial
or other gain" during international adoption activities.2"
Currently, U.S. adoption laws devote insufficient attention to improper
profiting from international adoptions. In particular, they fail to regulate
payments made by the adoptive parents of a child to the child's birth parent
or to an adoption intermediary. Once the United States ratifies the Conven-
tion, it must conform to all Convention mandates. Therefore, existing U.S.
international adoption law must be altered to include provisions regarding
discovery and prevention of improper profiting from adoptions.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Hague Convention and
details how the Convention curbs improper profiteering from intercountry
adoptions. Part II outlines current adoption goals, polices, and procedures
within the United States. Part III argues that the United States must change
16. In some Latin American countries, "spotters" tour the slums looking for pregnant
teenagers and women. Carroll Bogert, Bringing Back Baby, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1994, at 78.
Russia does not allow private adoptions. However, a "contribution" made to the or-
phanage may induce an orphanage director to declare a healthy child medically impaired,
making the child eligible for adoption. Id.
17. Sometimes, although rarely, children are actually kidnapped by intermediaries and
sold. In the mid-1980s, the New York Times exposed rings in Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico,
and other Latin American countries that kidnapped and sold children for export to the United
States. Sheila Rule, Couples Taking Unusual Paths for Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1984, at
Al.
Rumors persist about baby selling rings in Latin America. In early 1994, June
Weinstock, a journalist visiting Guatemala from the United States, was beaten by villagers
who suspected her of scouting for babies to steal. David Scanlan, Stolen Children? A Child-
Snatching Hysteria Sweeps the Country, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 18, 1994, at 36.
18. Hague Convention on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, In-
cluding the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134, 1139 [hereinafter Convention].
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an international organization
formed to work for the unification of rules of private international law. The Conference has
been in existence since 1893 and has drafted over 31 Conventions covering areas such as
trade law, international civil procedure, and child protection. Id. at 1145. The Conference has
38 member states and is headquartered in the Hague, Netherlands. The United States became
a member state in 1964. Kennard, supra note 8, at 631 n.43.
19. Treaty Actions, 5 U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch 445, 459 (Mar. 31, 1994).
20. Heather M. Little, Open Hearts: For Everyone a Child, For Everyone a Family, CHI. TRIB.,
July 10, 1994, §6 (WomaNews) at 1, 8.
21. Convention, arts. 8, 32, supra note 18, at 1140, 1143.
88 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY
its international adoption laws to conform with Hague Convention mandates
against improper gain from adoptions, and suggests ways in which U.S. law
may be revised to achieve this goal. This Note concludes that the new inter-
national guidelines offered by the Hague Convention, coupled with modifica-
tions in U.S. immigration law, provide a useful framework for curbing inter-
national adoption abuses.
I. THE HAGUE CONVENTION
A. Prior International Agreements
Until recently, the international community had not taken explicit steps
to address the problem of improper profiting from adoptions. Instead, "child
trafficking" sections were included in other international agreements. The
United Nations drafted several documents designed to regulate abuses
against children. These agreements, however, are not expansive enough to
provide procedural guidance in curbing trafficking in children for the pur-
poses of adoption.'
For example, in 1956, the United Nations passed the Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery.' Although this agreement prohibits trafficking
in children, it deals only with situations where children will be sexually
exploited or used as laborers.
Further developments occurred in 1986, when the United Nations
passed the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protec-
tion and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement
and Adoption Nationally and Internationally.24 This Declaration prohibits
"improper financial gain" derived from adoption.2 However, it only gener-
ally prohibits improper gain and fails to establish a procedural framework
that safeguards against such gain.
Soon thereafter, in 1989, the United Nations passed the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, which includes the first international declaration
specifically prohibiting child trafficking for any reason.' Article 35 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that states take "all appropri-
ate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of,
the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form." ' This
agreement does not specifically address adoptive placements. Further, like
the 1986 Declaration on Social and Legal Principles, it fails to outline clear
procedures. The 1994 Hague Convention takes extensive steps towards estab-
lishing this procedural framework.
22. International agreements drafted by the Hague Convention or the United Nations
have the legal force of treaties in countries which ratify them. Inherently, neither type of
agreement carries more force than the other; rather, the law of the particular country deter-
mines whether later-in-time agreements will supersede earlier agreements in that country.
23. Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 40.
24. Dec. 3, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 1096.
25. Id., art. 19, at 1101.
26. Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1456.
27. Kennard, supra note 8, at 630 n.40.
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In 1988, the Hague Conference on Private International Law initiated the
Intercountry Adoption Project,' which developed the Convention on Protec-
tion of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.'
The project was inspired by news reports of atrocities involving international
adoption in Romania after the fall of Ceaucescu. The Seventeenth Session
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the final text
of the Convention in 1993.31 Although several countries, including the Unit-
ed States, have signed the Convention,32 as of yet, none have ratified it. The
Convention becomes effective when the instruments of ratification of three
countries have been deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom
of the Netherlands, depository of the Convention.'
B. Goals, Policies, and Procedures Outlined by the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention distributes responsibilities for preventing baby
selling between countries that send children abroad for adoption, or "States
of Origin," and countries into which children are adopted, or "Receiving
States."' Participating States must comply with rigorous criteria before a
child is considered "adoptable" under the Convention. The Convention in-
cludes a general prohibition on "improper financial or other gain" from
adoptions and activities related to adoptions' and relies heavily on Con-
tracting States to pass specific laws to detect and prevent baby selling.'
An international adoption performed between Contracting States to the
Hague Convention must satisfy all Hague Convention requirements. These
requirements aim to facilitate international adoption for as many children as
possible, provided that important precautions against baby selling are ob-
served.
To comply with the Convention, each Contracting State must create a
"Central Authority" to oversee international adoptions.37 Existing govern-
mental organizations, such as public adoption agencies, may be authorized to
perform the functions of a Central Authority.' Private adoption agencies
28. Id. at 631.
29. See Convention, supra note 18, at 1134.
30. Kennard, supra note 8, at 631.
31. Convention, supra note 18, at 1134.
32. Treaty Actions, 5 U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch 445, 459 (Mar. 31, 1994) (listing Burkina
Faso, Canada, Finland, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
33. Convention, art. 43, supra note 18, at 1144.
34. The Convention only applies to children habitually resident in contracting states, and
specifically excludes refugee children and other internationally displaced children. Id., part C,
at 1145.
35. Id., arts. 8, 32, at 1140, 1143.
36. Id. at 1135 (Introductory Note by Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private
International Law, U.S. Department of State and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the 17th
Session of the Hague Conference).
37. Id., art. 6, at 1140.
38. Id., arts. 9-11, at 1140-41. All references hereafter to Central Authorities refer to any
body authorized or "accredited" by Central Authorities to perform these functions.
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may also perform these functions if they qualify as "accredited bodies"39
under the Hague Convention.
The most important responsibility of a Central Authority is to "take all
appropriate measures to prevent improper financial or other gain in connec-
tion with [adoptions]."' Central Authorities of States of Origin have chief
responsibility for assuring that parental consents have not been obtained
with the aid of financial inducements.4 However, the responsibility of Re-
ceiving States to determine whether the child is adoptable according to its
own laws,4 and the Convention mandate that an international adoption will
not go forward unless both States agree that it may proceed, 3 places the
burden on both States to ensure that no improper financial or other gain is
derived from an international adoption or a related activity."
Children are eligible for adoption under the Convention if the following
conditions are met: they are adoptable under the laws of their own country,
an international adoption is in their best interests, and the rigorous stan-
dards for consent to the adoption have been satisfied.45 Additionally, birth
parents or guardians must relinquish the child in writing and undergo coun-
seling as to the effect of their consent. 6 If consent by the birthmother is
required by the laws of the State of Origin, it must be given after the
birth. Importantly, consent must not have been induced by "payment or
compensation of any kind."'
Under the Hague Convention, each Receiving State determines which
children are adoptable into its territory.49 States may find fewer children
"adoptable" into their territory than would be "adoptable" under the Con-
vention itself However, States may not be less restrictive than the Hague
Convention. All States ratifying the Convention must adhere to each require-
ment.' Current U.S. law, which allows adoptions involving improper finan-
cial gain, does not satisfy the requirements of the Convention.
39. Accredited bodies must: pursue only non-profit objectives according to the limitations
and conditions of the state of accreditation, be directed and staffed by persons who are pro-
fessionally and ethically qualified to place children, and be supervised by competent au-
thorities of the State of Accreditation. Id., art. 11, at 1140-41.
Although the Convention does not explicitly state that private agencies meeting the
qualifications of accredited bodies must be authorized to perform the functions of Central Au-
thorities, the Art. 11 requirement that accredited bodies be supervised by the State of Accredi-
tation implies that private agencies who qualify as accredited bodies thereby become autho-
rized by the State to perform the functions of Central Authorities.
40. Id., art. 8, at 1140.
41. Id., art. 4, at 1140.
42. Id., art. 5, at 1140.
43. Id., art. 17, at 1141.
44. Id., art. 32, at 1143.
45. Id., art. 4, at 1139-40.
46. Id., at 1140.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id., art. 4, at 1139; see also id. at 1134 (Introductory Note).
50. Id., art. 40, at 1144.
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II. U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW: GOALS, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES
The body of U.S. law relating to international adoption is found in the
Immigration and Nationality Act."' While the Hague Convention focuses on
preventing improper, financial gain from adoptions, U.S. international adop-
tion laws contain no such provisions. Rather than curbing baby selling, U.S.
laws focus on keeping adoptive children with their birth families if at all
possible." As a result, the overall U.S. standard for adoptability inadequate-
ly addresses the aims of the Convention regarding child trafficking.
United States immigration statutes require that adoptive parents petition
the U.S. government for permission to bring alien children into the country.
These children are given high priority among immigrants because of the
time pressures inherent in their situation.' Prospective adoptive children
obtain an entry visa and are granted admission into the United States if they
fall into one of three categories: special immigrants," immediate relatives,
or aliens subject to numerical limitation.'
In order to enforce the mandates of the Hague Convention against the
sale of children, the U.S. petition process for international adoption will have
to be changed to include an accounting of all payments made in the process
51. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C §§ 1101-1525 (1988).
In the United States, an adoption must also be recognized by the state in which the
child will reside. While ratification of the Convention by the United States will not compel
changes in state laws, changes may be needed to comply with the spirit of the Convention.
Nearly all states prohibit the sale of children, but these laws may not apply expressly to
intercountry adoptions. See generally, Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. REV. 292, 304 (1989).
Under American choice-of-law rules, a court must apply the law of the forum state in
deciding whether to grant an adoption. Although usually applied to interstate adoptions, some
courts have used this approach in dealing with intercountry adoptions as well. Carlson, supra
note 4, at 362; see, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); 85 Op. Att'y.
Gen. No. U85-34 (Aug. 27, 1985) (Ga. unofficial opinion); Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson,
245 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Iowa 1976). Some states have laws providing for the recognition of
foreign adoption decrees as a matter of comity. Carlson, supra note 4, at 361 n.226 (listing
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Vermont).
52. Before a child may be adopted into the United States, she must fit the U.S. definition
of "orphan." To be classified as an orphan, a child must not have parents or must have one
parent who is incapable of taking care of her under the standards of that country. If a child
has one or two parents who are capable of taking care of her under the standards of her
native country, U.S. law will not recognize her as adoptable, even if her parents wish to give
her up. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(c)(2)(ii) (1994); infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
53. If prospective parents are waiting to adopt an infant, for example, the usual process-
ing delay experienced by adult immigrants to the United States-which can be months or
even years-is impracticable. Delay is also impracticable when a child is waiting to be adopt-
ed out of a region of war or extreme poverty. Carlson, supra note 4, at 344.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (1988).
55. This category includes children under the age of 16 who are in the legal custody of
adoptive parents and have resided with them for at least two years. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)
(1988). Most children entering the United States under this classification have been adopted by
persons who have been living or are based abroad. Liu, supra note 3, at 206.
56. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(f) (1988). This is a classification for aliens seeking admission
who do not fall into the other two categories. Numerical limitations are imposed on the num-
ber of these aliens permitted to enter from each country annually. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1988).
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of obtaining the child. Currently, the main document that adoptive parents
must file to bring an alien child into the United States as an "immediate
relative" is the 1-600 petition, or "Petition to Classify an Orphan as an Imme-
diate Relative."' The 1-600 is designed to ensure that the child will be
adopted into a healthy living situation. As a result, it requires much more
information about the prospective adoptive parents than about the child or
the circumstances involved in procuring the child." Prospective adoptive
parents are required to provide the child's birth certificate, a certified copy
of the adoption decree, and a translation of the decree if the adoption took
place in the child's native country.' Most importantly, they must provide
evidence of the child's "orphan" status.'"
Most children adopted internationally are brought into the United States
as "immediate relatives" under U.S. immigration law. 6' To fit within this
group, they must be (1) under the age of sixteen and (2) "orphans."' The
definition of "orphan" is the crux of the federal regulation of transnational
adoptions. In almost all cases, a child's adoptability into the United States
depends on whether she can be successfully categorized as an "orphan."'
Under U.S. law, children become "orphans" as a result of:
death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or
loss from, both parents, or [because] the sole or surviving parent is incapa-
ble of providing the proper care and has in writing irrevocably released a
child for emigration and adoption.M
According to the regulations for "orphan" status, children have a "sole par-
ent" when they are illegitimate and without a stepparent, and have a "sur-
viving parent" when one parent is living and there is no stepparent.' Chil-
57. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3 (1994).
58. Id. The 1-600 requires documentation that at least one of the adoptive parents is a
U.S. citizen, -as well as information on the adoptive parents' age and marital status. Prospec-
tive parents are required to submit a "home study:" an investigation of the adoptive parents
and their residence. Since most states also require a home study before they will validate the
adoption, the home study is usually performed by a licensed authority from the state in
which the adoptive parents will live. See Carlson, supra note 4, at 346.
59. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(c)(2)(i)(E), (H) (1994). The laws of most jurisdictions within the United
States also require that if a child is adopted abroad the parents must be present in front of
the court granting the adoption. Epstein, supra note 6, at 234 n.74.
60. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3 (c)(2)(i)(E)-(H) (1994).
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988); Liu, supra note 3, at 206. By categorization as "immedi-
ate relatives," prospective adoptive children avoid the wait for a numerically restricted visa, a
major cause of delay for most immigrants to the United States. Epstein, supra note 6, at 235
n.82.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F) (1988).
63. The rare cases in which children can be classified as "special immigrants" do not
depend on "orphan" status. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (1988).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(f) (1988). To be "incapable of providing proper care," the family
must be impoverished by local standards; a family no poorer average family than the average
family in a generally poor country will not qualify. Immigration & Naturalization Service, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Notice of Prospective Adopting Parents, Form-349 (May 9, 1991) [hereinafter
Notice] reprinted in Romanian Adoptions, supra note 2, at 23.
65. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(c)(2)(ii) (1994).
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dren have "no parents" when they are unconditionally "abandoned" to an
orphanage.'
These legal definitions have been criticized because the strict prerequi-
sites for designation as "abandoned" or "orphaned" complicate or preclude
adoption of many needy children. 7 Some children who might be considered
"adoptable" under Hague Convention standards are not considered "adopt-
able" under U.S. law because they are neither "orphaned" nor "abandoned."
For example, current U.S. law precludes international adoption of children
who are voluntarily given up by two parents.' Similarly, children whose
parents refuse to perform their natural or legal obligations or children who
are placed with an adoption agency, rather than an orphanage, are not
adoptable under U.S. law.' Finally, the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice warns that "[i]f the natural parents exercise any parental control over
the child, its placement or adoption, its support, or indicate an intent to re-
claim the child in the future, a finding of abandonment cannot be made,"
and the child will not be considered an orphan.'
The Hague Convention, on the other hand, does not dictate who may
release children for adoption, or the degree of parental contact children must
have to be "adoptable." Because of the narrow definitions of "orphan" and
"abandoned" in U.S. law, children who are considered "adoptable" under
the Convention may not be "adoptable" into the United States.
In at least one important regard, the U.S. definition of "adoptability" is
less restrictive than that of the Hague Convention. The "orphan" definition
is insufficient by itself to battle trafficking in children. Although the defini-
tion requires that children have been "irrevocably released" by their birth
parents, it does not ensure that the parents have not been paid to give the
children up. Consequently, current U.S. law fails to comply with the funda-
mental aims of the Hague Convention.
III. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
AND THE HAGUE CoNvENIoN
Current U.S. law fails to conform to the Hague Convention's flat prohi-
bition against improper financial or other gain "in connection with an adop-
66. Id.
67. Commentators argue that parents may resort to "abandoning" children so that they
may be legally adopted into the United States. Jane T. Ellis, Note, The Law and Procedure of
International Adoption: An Overview, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 361, 387-88 (1983); Liu supra
note 3, at 207.
68. Ellis, supra note 67, at 387-88.
69. In one exception, the child of an adulterous relationship was considered abandoned.
Id. at 388 n.177 (discussing In re Del Conte, 10 I. & N. Dec. 761 (1964)).
70. Notice, supra note 64, reprinted in Romanian Adoptions, supra note 2, at 23. This narrow
definition of abandonment created tremendous problems for U.S. citizens attempting to adopt
Romanian children in 1990 and 1991. "Even a brief period of living with one parent or an-
other may cause the visa petition to be denied." Romanian Adoptions, supra note 2, at 106
(statement of Melanie Barnes, adoptive mother of Romanian child).
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tion"' or "from an activity related to an intercountry adoption."' The Im-
migration and Nationality Act' does not require that an adoption interme-
diary or the child's birth parents forgo profit from the adoption.4 As a re-
sult, adoption intermediaries are able to demand money from adoptive par-
ents at the beginning of the process and trap them into paying additional
amounts before the adoption is over.7 As long as the adoptive parents are
able to get the healthy child they have been promised, and can prove that
the child will go to a good home, U.S. immigration law ignores any pay-
ments made to get the baby.'
Although the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) investigates
"fraudulent practices" in adoption, the current investigative procedure is
inadequate. The "fraudulent practices" investigated by the INS are limited to
outright fraud, such as the non-delivery of promised babies when large fees
have been charged, or representation of adoptive children as healthy when
they are in fact very ill.' It appears that the INS does not investigate "fees"
or other money paid to intermediaries or adoptive parents.' The agency's
literature implies that the INS does not routinely investigate orphan petitions
to uncover possible illicit payments.' Instead, adoptive parents are urged to
demand an accounting of the services for which they are paying an agency
or intermediary on their own accord.'
To be in compliance with the Hague Convention, the United States
must define "improper financial or other gain in connection with an adop-
tion"81 and establish procedures for monitoring this type of gain. Every in-
temational adoption, even if done through a licensed agency, involves a fee
for finding and processing the children. In many circumstances, the birth
71. Convention, art. 8, supra note 18, at 1140.
72. Id., art. 32, at 1143.
73. See supra note 51.
74. A 60 Minutes segment on adoption of Romanian babies contained the following ex-
change with Virginia Young, Consul General at the American Embassy in Romania:
Ms. Young: "There's nothing in our law that says if they, paid $1000, that
that [sic] makes it illegal."
Reporter: "How can our laws accept selling children?"
Ms. Young: "Well, I don't think it was even considered at the time that the
law was put into effect."
60 Minutes: Babies for Sale (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 14, 1991) [hereinafter 60 Minutes],
transcript reprinted in Romanian Adoptions, supra note 2, at 238.
75. 60 Minutes, supra note 74, transcript reprinted in Romanian Adoptions, supra note 2, at
235-40; see also supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
76. The lack of disciplinary action against adoptive parents may stem from legislators'
and courts' perception of the adoptive parents as the children's rescuers, especially if they
end up in good homes. See McConahay, supra note 1, at 13-15.
77. INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS, supra note 7, at 19.
78. INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS, supra note 7, at 6-8 (listing outright fraud and non-deliv-
ery of children as the only matters investigated by the Service).
79. There is no evidence in any of the intercountry adoption literature, including the
Hearings on Romanian Adoptions, that the I.N.S. has ever investigated the amount of money
changing hands in the course of an adoption.
80. INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS, supra note 7, at 8.
81. Convention, art. 8, supra note 18, at 1140.
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parents or the intermediary who procures the children receives part of the
fee.'
There is no consensus as to whether this practice should be considered
abusive. One could argue that the exchange of a small amount of money for
a child is not harmful. Adoptive parents pay the expenses associated with
adoption under any circumstances, and many wish to give the birth mother
"something" anyway. If the adoptive parents receive the children whom they
chose, the birth parents freely consent to the adoption, and the children are
placed in good homes, then one can argue that no one has been harmed by
a small amount of money changing hands. If the payment has not "induced"
the birth parents to relinquish the child, then an adoption of the type de-
scribed above might be interpreted to fit within the standards of the Hague
Convention.
Problems with payments for children arise, however, in cases involving
larger amounts of money, especially if the money is paid to intermediaries
rather than birth parents. A large payment increases the likelihood that con-
sent to the adoption has not been given freely and, therefore, that the adop-
tion has not been conducted according to the requirements of the Hague
Convention.' Although an adoption in which an exorbitant fee is paid is
not within the bounds of the Hague Convention, it is not per se against
current U.S. law.'
Undoubtedly, investigations into payments made to birth parents and
intermediaries would be difficult to carry out. In many countries sending
large numbers of children to the United States, some payment to a country's
adoption agency in return for children is common.' In other countries,
where babies are procured through largely unofficial means, detecting pay-
ments is almost impossible for either native adoption officials or U.S. immi-
gration officials.'
One way to conduct such investigations would be to require that
adoptive parents entering a country to consummate an international adoption
provide an accounting of all cash in their possession at entry and documen-
tation for cash spent in the country at their departureY Additionally, birth
parents and intermediaries could be required to testify to U.S. immigration
officials as to how much money they have received in connection with an
adoption. If any party receives an amount which U.S. officials suspect induc-
82. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
83. Convention, supra note 18, arts. 8, 32, at 1140, 1143.
84. See supra note 74.
85. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
86. "It's very difficult to say whether the women I see in chambers have been paid [for
their babies] or not. I've got suspicions about certain lawyers, but I can't prove anything. No
one has ever brought me a receipt." McConahay, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting Honduras
Family Court Judge Teodolinda Pineda de Aguilar).
87. See generally 60 Minutes, supra note 74, reprinted in Romanian Adoptions, supra note 2, at
235 (explaining that many prospective adoptive parents bring large amounts of cash into
countries in which they hope to find children in order to pay bribes to adoption intermediar-
ies, birth parents, and other facilitators).
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es consent to the adoption, then the children should not be allowed to immi-
grate.'
The Hague Convention includes a number of provisions that can help
the United States prevent an adoption once improper gain has been discov-
ered. Since adoptions under the Hague Convention may go forward only if
both States of Origin and Receiving States agree to them,? the United States
can refuse to allow suspicious adoptions to proceed. It can refuse to recog-
nize, as contrary to public policy, adoptions involving improper payments. °
In addition, the United States may prevent foreign adoption agencies sus-
pected of extracting improper gains from acting in its territory."
IV. CONCLUSION
The number of international adoptions has increased steadily during the
last five decades and probably will continue to rise. The Hague Convention
on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption is an important first step in curbing the abuses too often associat-
ed with international adoption.
As the country receiving the largest number of transnationally adopted
children, 2 the United States is presented with a unique opportunity to im-
plement legislation preventing improper financial gain from adoptions. In
particular, U.S. law can and should define what payments for adoptive chil-
dren are "improper."
United States immigration law should also mandate an investigation
into all money paid throughout the international adoption process. Prospec-
tive adoptive children should not be classified as "adoptable" into the Unit-
ed States until immigration officials find that no one has received improper
financial gain from the adoption. When the United States ratifies the Hague
Convention by implementing legislation that effectively prevents baby sell-
ing, then U.S. citizens who wish to adopt internationally will no longer con-
front potential moral challenges in their efforts to adopt.
88. See Convention, art. 5(c), supra note 18, at 1140 ("An adoption within the scope of the
Convention shall take place only if the competent authorities of the Receiving State have ...
determined that the child is or will be authorized to enter and reside permanently in that
State.").
89. Id., arts. 5-6, at 1140.
90. Id., art. 24, at 1142.
91. Article 12 of the Convention provides that "[a] body accredited in one state may act
in another Contracting State only if the competent authorities of both states have authorized it
to do so." Id., art. 12, at 1141. Since the generally accepted function of adoption agencies is to
handle adoptions, a prohibition against "acting" in a state will likely be construed as a prohi-
bition against handling adoptions from within that country. At this writing, however, no offi-
cial interpretive material on the Convention was available.
92. See Romanian Adoptions, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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